Re: Application-level Attacks

[George Capehart <capegeo () opengroup org>]

Stephen P. Berry wrote:

<snip>

> If you want a one-liner to take away from all this, I suppose my
> observation in a nutshell is that we talk too much about mechanisms
> and too little about consequences.  This makes sense in that the latter
> is very much a context-dependent thing (and therefore isnt' terribly
> suitable for whitepapers and marketing blurbs), but that's where
> most of the actual interesting stuff is.

Aaaaahhhhhh.  The structure vs. function dichotomy rears its head again 
. . . This should make for many late nights . . .  :>

Cheers,

/g
--
"With sufficient thrust, pigs fly just fine."  -- RFC1925

> - -spb
>
> - -----
> 0       What exactly, if anything, it is -not- a lousy model of is
>         another question altogther.
> 1       If a particular bug is a buffer overflow, for example, we
>         can certainly make some general statements about buffer
>         overflows---but being a buffer overflow isn't necessarily
>         interesting information from the risk analysis standpoint[2].
> 2       Mod the case where part of your defence-in-depth strategy
>         involves nonexecutable stacks, StackGuard or an isomorphism
>         thereof, Multics, or whatever.
>
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