CVE-2026-49099: Apache Camel: Camel-Salesforce: Non-Camel-prefixed Exchange header constants (sObjectQuery, sObjectSearch, apexUrl, ...) bypass the HTTP header filter, allowing an HTTP client to inject SOQL/SOSL queries, override the target SObject, and redirect Apex REST calls using t

[Andrea Cosentino <acosentino () apache org>]

Severity: moderate 

Affected versions:

- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce) 4.0.0 before 4.14.8
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce) 4.15.0 before 4.18.3
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce) 4.19.0 before 4.21.0

Description:

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'), Authorization 
Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Salesforce Component.

The camel-salesforce producer resolves its operation parameters - the SOQL query, the SOSL search, the target SObject 
name and id, the Apex REST URL and method, and the Apex query parameters - from Exchange message headers, reading the 
header in preference to the value configured on the endpoint (AbstractSalesforceProcessor.getParameter() reads the 
header first and uses the endpoint configuration only as a fallback). The control-header constants in 
SalesforceEndpointConfig (for example SOBJECT_QUERY = sObjectQuery, SOBJECT_SEARCH = sObjectSearch, SOBJECT_NAME = 
sObjectName, SOBJECT_ID = sObjectId, APEX_URL = apexUrl, APEX_METHOD = apexMethod, and the apexQueryParam. prefix) used 
plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, 
HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an 
inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) 
into a salesforce: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set these headers and override what the route intended - 
supplying its own SOQL query or SOSL search to read data from any SObject the connected Salesforce user can access, 
overriding the target SObject name and id for CRUD operations, or redirecting an Apex REST call to a different endpoint 
and HTTP method (including destructive methods) with injected query parameters. All such operations run with the full 
permissions of the Salesforce connected (integration) user, which is typically broad. No credentials are required from 
the attacker when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases 
stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are 
suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set Salesforce operation parameters via the raw header 
names must use the CamelSalesforce* names (for example CamelSalesforceSObjectQuery and CamelSalesforceApexUrl) instead 
of the old sObject* / apex* values; the endpoint-option spelling is unchanged. For deployments that cannot upgrade 
immediately, strip the Salesforce control headers from any untrusted ingress before the salesforce: producer (for 
example removeHeaders('sObject*') and removeHeaders('apex*') at the start of the route), and set the query, SObject and 
Apex parameters from a trusted source.

Credit:

Yu Bao from PayPal (finder)
Andrea Cosentino (remediation developer)

References:

https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-49099.html
https://camel.apache.org/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-49099