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CVE-2026-60093: Apache Camel: Camel-Azure-Storage-DataLake: the downloadToFile operation built the local download target from the remote path name without constraining it to the configured fileDir


From: Andrea Cosentino <acosentino () apache org>
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2026 14:05:31 +0000

Severity: moderate 

Affected versions:

- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-azure-storage-datalake) 4.0.0 before 4.14.9
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-azure-storage-datalake) 4.15.0 before 4.18.4
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-azure-storage-datalake) 4.19.0 before 4.22.0

Description:

Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Azure-Storage Datalake component



This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0.



The camel-azure-storage-datalake component can download an Azure Data Lake Storage Gen2 file to the local filesystem 
through its downloadToFile operation, writing into the directory named by the fileDir endpoint option. 
DataLakeFileOperations.downloadToFile built the local target by joining fileDir with the remote path name exactly as 
the Azure SDK reported it (new File(fileDir, fileClientWrapper.getFileName())) and passed the result straight to the 
SDK download call, with no lexical normalization and no check that the resolved location stayed inside fileDir. The 
remote name is not route-controlled data: the consumer enumerates the filesystem in 
DataLakeConsumer.createBatchExchangesFromPath, which lists paths and creates one exchange per entry from 
PathItem.getName() verbatim, applying no name filtering by default. A path name containing parent-directory segments 
therefore resolved to a location outside the configured fileDir, letting anyone able to influence the names present in 
the consumed Data Lake filesystem cause Camel to create or overwrite a file at a location of their choosing, with the 
privileges of the Camel process. Depending on what the process can write to, overwriting a file outside the download 
directory can escalate beyond the loss of integrity of that file. The fileDir option is an ordinary common-group 
configuration parameter and carries no security marker, so nothing signalled to users that its value was not being 
enforced as a containment boundary. Camel's other file-download consumers - camel-file, camel-ftp, camel-smb, 
camel-mina-sftp and camel-azure-files - already constrained their local downloads to the configured directory using a 
path-segment boundary check; the camel-azure-storage-datalake download path was not covered by that work.



Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases 
stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.9. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are 
suggested to upgrade to 4.18.4. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, constrain the names the consumer will 
act on using the regex endpoint option, which is applied to each listed path name as a full-string match, so that only 
simple single-segment names are accepted and any name carrying a path separator or a parent-directory segment is 
filtered out before an exchange is created. Alternatively, avoid the downloadToFile operation on untrusted filesystems 
and write the payload from the route under a file name the route itself controls, rather than one taken from the remote 
listing. As defence in depth, treat the object names in any externally writable Data Lake filesystem as untrusted input 
and do not derive local filesystem paths from them.

Credit:

Hiep Nguyen (finder)
n0mi1k (finder)
Andrea Cosentino (remediation developer)

References:

https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-60093.html
https://camel.apache.org/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60093


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